



In Greece, debt and deficits climbed to precipitous levels.

The massive spending increases behind this drove up wages and prices, badly undermining competitiveness, and setting the stage for the crisis.




## 1. Design of the SBA

# Fiscal adjustment was expected to boost market confidence and restore financing




# Structural reforms were designed to improve competitiveness and trigger an export-led recovery. (which would help reduce the impact of fiscal adjustment).




### 2. SBA IMPLEMENTATION

Experience and outcomes

Competitiveness problems have proven less tractable, and the recession has proven deeper than expected.




### Significant fiscal adjustment, but soaring debt and spreads...




### 3. The new EFF program


**Policy Adaptation** 


The new program places emphasis on directly securing faster competitiveness improvements to bring forward the recovery




# Additional financing, including via debt relief, provides Greece with time to restore external sustainability









# Fiscal adjustment has been slowed down and debt relief has placed public debt on a better (but still risky) trajectory




# Portugal


### Problem 1: Unsustainable fiscal policies






# Problem 2: High corporate, household and financial sector indebtedness






# Problem 3: Loss of competitiveness, resulting in low-growth and a high current account deficit




1/ Negative = increase in labor productivity.

### Pillar 1: Fiscal Solvency





### Magnitude and Timing of Fiscal Adjustment in Euro Area (change in structural primary balance as percent of GDP)<sup>1</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Since structural adjustment started -- between 2009 and 2012 depending on the country (2011 for Portugal).


# Pillar 2: Enhancing Growth and Competitiveness







Source: OECD. 2009 data for Portugal and France.

### Pillar 3: Private Sector Deleveraging







# 11-months into the program, some encouraging signs...




### So far so good, but significant challenges ahead








# Pre-Program Policy Response was Substantial but Bank Funding Runs Force Program in late 2010




# High Private Debts Increase the Risk of a Pernicious Downward Cycle



### Bank Recapitalization—Credible, Cost Mitigated


### **Recapitalization** (Billions of euros)



### Deleveraging—Phased, mostly Offshore Assets Deleveraging, 2011-2013 (Euro billions) (Loan/Deposit %) 300 190 Disposals 180% Met amortization 180 250 ■Impairments and other 170 Non-core **Assets** 200 160 Non-core 150 150 140 100 130 Loan to Core Core **Assets Assets Deposit Ratio** 120 122.5% 50 110 0100 End 2010 2011 2012 2013 End 2013

# Fiscal Consolidation: Front-loaded but Phased (Target 3% Deficit in 2015)





### Positive Experience So Far, But Risks Remain

